Interview by Bálint Ablonczy | January 9, 2026
[Translation from Hungarian]

More than five thousand people have already signed a petition initiated by three Slovak Hungarian activists—János Fiala-Butora, an international lawyer; Örs Orosz, a heritage conservationist; and Attila Stubendek, an engineer—against a legal amendment that punishes criticism of the Beneš Decrees (which collectively declared Hungarians and Germans guilty after World War II) with up to six months in prison. The petition committee members have reported themselves to the police, and proceedings have been initiated against them.

Three years ago in Válasz Online, Fiala-Butora drew attention to asset confiscations still occurring today in Slovakia based on the Beneš Decrees. Now, he says that he and his two colleagues are prepared to accept a prison sentence if necessary, though he sees this scenario as less than likely at present. He was not surprised by Hungary’s lukewarm government response: in his view, over the past decade, Hungary’s government has, due to political considerations, swept issues like Slovakia’s discriminatory state language law and the dual citizenship question under the rug. He also disagrees with the Tisza party’s proposal to expel the Slovak ambassador, believing that European pressure would be more helpful. An in-depth interview.

Apple juice or orange juice?

Pardon?

Which do you prefer? We’d like to know what to bring during prison visits…

Ah, I see! Friends have already suggested a few things, and I’ve bought quite a bit just in case things turn that way… if I have to choose, I’d say apple juice.

Did you and your two colleagues initiate the petition because you want to be martyrs? Or because you want to highlight the absurdity of the Criminal Code amendment that punishes criticism of the Beneš Decrees with up to six months in prison?

Several considerations guided our action. The Criminal Code amendment is a completely misguided step, and our action can highlight this absurdity. The Fico cabinet simply wanted to prevent debate. They want to intimidate people with legal uncertainty so that no one dares speak out or criticize the decrees. However, if someone does raise their voice and the law must then be applied, the state finds itself in a very difficult position because it’s obvious that this provision violates the constitution and human rights. And if they don’t apply the law, they make fools of themselves. This legal uncertainty has indeed deterred many people, even though countless people are outraged by the Criminal Code amendment. But we thought it through: we decided to issue the petition and thereby deliberately violate the law; and by turning ourselves in, we are also protecting those who join our initiative.

You mean no proceedings can be initiated against them?

At least not while our case is open. So far, even law enforcement officials are scratching their heads. More than a hundred prosecutors signed a statement saying that the legal amendment is inapplicable and unconstitutional, and the attorney general has referred the amendment to the Constitutional Court. At the Komárno police headquarters, we didn’t sense great enthusiasm from the uniformed officers when we reported ourselves. The process we initiate will run its course, thereby making clear what the law applies to and what it doesn’t. And during this period, petition signers are safe.

What did your family say?

My wife is a lawyer; she is able to size up the situation.

So you went to the Komárno police headquarters and self-reported yourselves by presenting the petition questioning the Beneš Decrees. What’s the next step?

After some deliberation, the police filed our document, and now an investigation is supposed to begin. They will establish the facts, and then the prosecutor will have to decide whether one can violate the Criminal Code through a constitutionally protected action—namely, exercising our right to free speech. As a lawyer, I can tell you what a coherent interpretation would be, but ultimately, the prosecutor and judge will make the final decision.

Fundamentally, this legal amendment shouldn’t even exist, because it amounts to a very broad restriction of constitutional rights. Furthermore, it’s extremely imprecise: it’s not even clear what the Criminal Code prohibits. No one knows what ‘questioning or denying the Beneš Decrees’ or ‘the laws serving as the basis for post-World War II settlement’ means. Something this imprecise cannot serve as the basis for legal sanctions.

You are arguing the legal standpoint, but in one of your articles, you state that the issue of the Beneš Decrees amounts to a state ideology in Slovakia. How can you be sure that if the two standpoints collide, the latter won’t win out? There could be a prosecutor and judge who, despite their legal doubts, make a decision based on how they think a good Slovak patriot should decide, and send the complaining Hungarians to prison.

That’s why we had to carefully discuss whether we would accept imprisonment; it wasn’t easy to assemble the petition committee. I approached some others who decided not to participate, which I completely understand. Obviously, we’re not keen on going behind bars – that’s currently a less likely scenario – but precisely for the reasons you mention, we can’t rule it out.

The root of the legal restrictions based on the Beneš Decrees: Slovak anxiety

Miklós Duray, who died three years ago, was imprisoned in 1982 – among other reasons, for his minority rights advocacy and protest against plans to shut down Hungarian schools in Czechoslovakia. Isn’t your current predicament a painful historical déjà vu?

Indeed, many have pointed out the parallel. However, there’s an important difference: Slovakia is a member of the European Union and the European Convention on Human Rights. For that reason, I believe that in the long run, we will definitely win a legal dispute; however, this is a lengthy process, and we may have to go to prison in the meantime. On the other hand, the fact is that someone had to take this on; otherwise, the uncertainty regarding these outrageous legal violations would just continue. The Fico government’s goal is precisely this – to maintain the atmosphere of uncertainty. Meanwhile, they are basically not speaking out at all on this issue, not even to defend their position.

When Slovakia was in the process of joining the EU, the European Commission asked the Slovak government at the time whether they were still applying the Benešdecrees, and they said they weren’t. Then it turned out that in fact, they were. What’s the situation in the Czech Republic? It could be an important argument if the other half of the former Czechoslovak state takes a different approach.

Prague is not applying the Beneš Decrees. The main reason for the difference is that after the war, essentially all Germans were expelled from the Czech lands, while in Slovakia, despite all legal violations and discrimination, a significant Hungarian community remained. The Slovaks often refer to their older Czech brother. I’m curious when Prague will bang on the table and insist that Bratislava leave them out of this story—because in the Czech Republic, the decrees are indeed not being applied.

Let’s also talk about the political dimension alongside the legal one. What should the European Union or the Commission do when a member state passes a law that violates fundamental rights?

From a legal perspective, it’s perfectly clear that the asset confiscations violate EU treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Since foreign nationals are also affected, the situation also violates the principle of free movement of capital. There are multiple reasons why the Commission should initiate an infringement procedure against Slovakia.

At the same time, this is such a serious matter that its consequences could be incalculable. I don’t like it, but I understand why [EU authorities] are trying to avoid dealing with the issue – it basically calls Slovakia’s EU membership into question.

Why?

As I mentioned, this question was raised before 2004 [prior to Slovakia’s EU accession], which Bratislava deflected by saying they weren’t applying the decrees. Now it turns out that Slovakia is indeed applying them. Does this call Slovakia’s EU membership into question? An absurd notion—no one wants to see the country outside the EU, and neither do I. Should the EU force Slovakia to change its mind about the decrees? But how? The EU is not without its instruments, but lately they’re very selective about when they intervene. At the same time, if the Commission acts selectively in cases of fundamental rights violations, it damages their credibility.

It’s getting ever more difficult to understand why the Slovak government majority went down this road…

We shouldn’t look for a rational explanation. In Slovakia, there’s a nationalist spiral: whenever someone protests against the Beneš Decrees, nationalist politicians and voters react not to the protest per se—instead, they project their imagined fears. These people are genuinely afraid for Slovakia’s territorial integrity. From this point on, the issue always gets twisted, and that’s what happened now. I don’t think Robert Fico and his people are happy with the current situation, or even with the confiscations themselves. But they can’t stop it, because then they’d have to seriously confront the problem. From their perspective, the best thing would be if everyone stayed quiet and looked the other way. But with this new legal amendment, they’ve achieved the opposite effect.

As a lawyer, you’ve also represented decree-injured parties before European judicial forums. Besides Miklós Bosits, have others won lawsuits?

In the Slovak courts, some injured parties have won, others haven’t. But even Miklós Bosits’s case isn’t over: the Slovak Supreme Court last year rejected the European Court of Human Rights’ decision. It is unwilling to implement the judgment and continues to maintain that Miklós Bosits’s property must be confiscated. The case is now before the Slovak Constitutional Court and will probably go back to Strasbourg.

You appear frequently in Slovak media—what are the reactions? Is there openness to your arguments?

There is openness, but you have to understand that I only reach the more liberal, Hungarian-friendly part of the Slovak public. I haven’t yet succeeded in initiating dialogue with the nationalist side.

Is the Hungarian minority in Slovakia concerned with this issue? Only a few hundred turned out for the demonstration in Dunajská Streda (Dunaszerdahely)—though admittedly it was four days before Christmas.

They are definitely concerned; no one says it’s a pseudo-problem. Many people are affected due to family ties or their ancestors. This question [the Beneš Decrees and their application] has fundamentally determined Slovak-Hungarian relations and Slovak attitudes toward Hungarians.

You mentioned nationalists anxious about Slovakia’s territorial integrity– for them, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán remains the embodiment of this threat. Have they not realized that, for a decade now, he’s been building a partnership alliance with Robert Fico, and that on the Beneš Decrees issue, he’s basically remained silent?

Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán’s conduct doesn’t influence Robert Fico’s nationalist voters. Recently, we’ve heard numerous Slovak statements that take it for granted that Viktor Orbán pulls the strings and the entire current situation is part of a grand Hungarian irredentist plan. The debates in Hungary don’t get through; in Slovakia, they don’t understand Budapest’s difficult position. I wasn’t particularly surprised by the Hungarian cabinet’s silence, because the rapprochement with Fico has been underway since 2012-13. This doesn’t mean Viktor Orbán has turned against the Hungarian minority; he’s simply balancing two perspectives. We’ve seen numerous examples of Robert Fico being more important than our minority community. For instance, in recent years we’ve seen no progress regarding provisions disadvantageous to minorities in the state language law, the citizenship law, positions in public administration, or as regards the persistent underdevelopment of South Slovak territories inhabited by Hungarians. Moreover, the situation is asymmetrical to some extent: on the international stage, the Slovak government needs Hungary’s support less than the other way around. Fico doesn’t want to appear as an illiberal leader; he doesn’t want to be a wrench in the European works. He’s satisfied to just rule the roost at home. We’re in a situation where the Hungarian government really can’t do anything useful: a violent outburst wouldn’t solve anything. The only possible path—mobilizing European public opinion and the EU—doesn’t work either because the Hungarian government has lost all international credibility by now. As for the opposition [in Hungary], I’d be cautious there, too; Slovakia-critical rhetoric is rather counterproductive.

In other words, it’s a political mistake for Péter Magyar to threaten expulsion of the Slovak ambassador if the Tisza Party wins the election?

I understand that from a domestic political perspective [in Hungary], it’s a low-hanging fruit, and you can point to the prime minister’s hypocrisy. But [the Slovak-Hungarian conflict] is a deep-rooted and long-standing problem that can only be addressed by building a partnership relationship—expelling the ambassador is not the best way to begin.

The Tisza party tried to put the matter urgently on the agenda in the European Parliament – this attempt was blocked by the Patriots faction, which includes Fidesz.

A European Parliament resolution isn’t a magic bullet, but it helps move the issue out of the Hungarian-Slovak trench warfare. If Slovak people hear every argument from a Hungarian position, they see a Slovak-phobic conspiracy behind it. It’s quite different when Spanish, Irish, or Belgian politicians say it won’t be good—that can have an effect.

Gergely Gulyás said at yesterday’s government briefing [in Hungary] that the legal amendment [in Slovakia] hasn’t been applied yet, so there’s no specific case the Hungarian government can protest against.

Proceedings were initiated against us last Saturday, so this is factually incorrect. The Hungarian press also reported on it. We hope that Minister Gulyás will learn about it from Válasz Online, if not elsewhere.

Do the ethnic Hungarian political forces in Slovakia stand behind you? Örs Orosz is a local government representative from Nitra County of the Hungarian Alliance Party, and party chairman László Gubík gave a speech at the anti-decree demonstration organized by the Slovak opposition. What do Slovak Hungarian voters think about the fact that their representatives are now working alongside liberals whom Hungarian and Slovak government propaganda have branded as ‘Brusselites’ and ‘Sorosists’?

This creates cognitive dissonance for those who really believe in the sovereigntist/anti-globalist alliance. But the Hungarian community in Slovakia is ideologically stratified: the majority is conservative, yet committed to their rights. The current situation shows that we can only expect minority rights advocacy from conservative-liberal parties, never from Fico.

A new shift is underway. Following the regime change [with the end of communist rule], ethnic Hungarians always allied with Western conservative and liberal parties against post-communist nationalist Vladimír Mečiar. The Hungarian minority has certainly been disappointed by these parties, and many no longer even saw any difference between the two major Slovak blocs. But this is now changing. Robert Fico continues to build on anti-Hungarian reflexes, and against him there’s a liberal camp that is not particularly Hungarian-friendly but is somewhat open to minority issues—they’re the ones willing to discuss these questions. I believe the Hungarian Alliance Party sees this shift too.

In your petition, you also formulate proposals: you request reparations, an apology for the decrees, and the establishment of an expert committee. Perhaps you agree that this is unrealistic.

Indeed, I have no illusions that the Fico government will confront Slovak state ideology and proceed to dismantle it. But our goal is rather to use the reverberations of the current situation to explain to the receptive part of Slovak public opinion what we’re actually talking about. We want to show that resolving the Beneš Decrees issue isn’t as dangerous as many have thought. Our biggest problem was that it was always hushed up; we could not even articulate what direction we wanted to take, nor could the Slovaks articulate exactly what they feared. If our petition succeeds in bringing these views into public discourse and even convincing some politicians and journalists, it will have been worthwhile. We can make a start down the road.

Válasz Online

Please follow and like us: