According to a recent survey, most people in Romania would support a presidential candidate who is hostile towards the Hungarian minority.

The Romanian political landscape has recently been characterized by significant tensions and conflicts, increasingly pointing to the strengthening of far-right political currents. A public opinion poll conducted in early January indicates that independent presidential candidate Călin Georgescu, known for his anti-Hungarian and antisemitic statements, enjoys substantial support among potential presidential candidates. According to a survey published on January 26 by the polling institute CURS, Georgescu leads with 37 percent support, raising serious questions about shifts in the Romanian political landscape, particularly regarding impact on the Hungarian community.

The Survey and Political Context

According to the CURS poll, Călin Georgescu holds a significant lead over other candidates. Nicușor Dan, the mayor of Bucharest and a candidate for the USR party, would receive 21 percent of the vote, while Crin Antonescu, the PSD-PNL-RMDSZ government coalition candidate, would garner 18 percent.

Another crucial finding of the survey is that Georgescu is perceived as the most trustworthy political figure by the public, which could be a factor in his popularity. However, a closer examination of the political and social context reveals that his radical views—such as statements praising the leaders of the banned Iron Guard fascist organization, his remarks against the Hungarian community, and his attacks on RMDSZ (the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania)—have sparked numerous political debates.

The Dangers of Far-Right Rhetoric: Attacks and Quotes

On January 15, 2025, in a video interview with the news portal Maszol, RMDSZ President Hunor Kelemen scrutinized Georgescu’s ties to intelligence services. According to Kelemen, Georgescu was able to study and work in New York and London in the 1980s due to his connections with the Securitate, the former Romanian secret police, arguing that “ordinary” Romanian citizens did not have access to such opportunities under communism.

“He presented himself as anti-establishment, yet he is a man of the old system. He continued his studies in New York and London in 1986—this was not something just anyone could achieve, and it is evident that he belonged to that network. He even stated that his mentor was Mircea Malița, who was part of what can be described as the Caraman network.”

The Romanian public knows little about the two individuals Kelemen mentioned. Mircea Malița, born in Oradea, was a mathematician and academic, likely an undercover agent of the Securitate. After the 1989 change of regime, he founded a private foundation, in which Georgescu was involved for a time. Mihail Caraman was the first director of Romania’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SIE) after the fall of communism. Before the 1989 revolution, he worked as an officer for the Securitate and was even awarded by the infamous Soviet KGB for acquiring valuable NATO headquarters intelligence.

Two days later, on January 17 of this year, Georgescu, appearing on Realitatea TV—a media outlet considered his mouthpiece—avoided questions about his past ties to the Securitate but launched a direct attack on RMDSZ, which he referred to as the equivalent of an “HOA,” and questioned the loyalty and patriotism of RMDSZ politicians:

“I believe that if we were to examine a little more closely this HOA—which is not a party— and it will probably be investigated very soon, many things would come to light. (…) If today’s Minister of Finance holds dual citizenship, how far has the current system’s incompetence gone? I have nothing to answer. I stand upright before God, and it will be a great honor to meet my ancestors when the time comes. They cannot do the same.”

Georgescu’s words were intended to discredit not just RMDSZ and Romania’s current Finance Minister, ethnic Hungarian Barna Tánczos, but other minority leaders who hold dual citizenship with Hungary. The message is clear: key positions should not be held by individuals of Hungarian ethnicity or descent.

According to Kelemen, Georgescu’s credibility is highly questionable. Behind his extremist rhetoric stands a man of the old system who tries to position himself as an anti-establishment candidate while his statements continue to cause growing political and social damage. Georgescu’s example highlights the dangers posed by far-right ideologies and their rhetorical tools. Such statements not only attack minorities but also pose a serious threat to political stability and democratic values.

Implications and Consequences

For the Hungarian community, which has historically played a significant role in Romania, these threats and inflammatory speeches not only fuel social tensions but also raise legal and political dilemmas.

The Romanian political scene needs to take far-right political trends and their representatives more seriously and ensure that society does not provide space for views that further deepen divisions between communities. It will be crucial for RMDSZ and other political organizations to emphasize the protection of minority rights and to ensure the representation of Romania’s Hungarian community at all levels of political decision-making.

Election Prospects and the Future

It remains to be seen whether Georgescu will actually enter the presidential race. However, based on the survey results, if he does run, he has a strong chance of becoming a key player in the first round of the election. Nevertheless, Romanian politics and public opinion can shift rapidly, meaning that election outcomes will depend on further statements made during the campaign and subsequent political developments.

For Romania’s Hungarian community, the coming months will be crucial in shaping future political directions.

Source: Madinner, Magyar Hang, Krónika, Maszol

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